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Georgy Artemov
Georgy Artemov
Adresse e-mail validée de unimelb.edu.au
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Strategic ‘mistakes’: Implications for market design research
G Artemov, YK Che, Y He
NBER working paper, 2017
1112017
Robust virtual implementation: Toward a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine
G Artemov, T Kunimoto, R Serrano
Journal of Economic Theory 148 (2), 424-447, 2013
66*2013
Assignment mechanisms: common preferences and information acquisition
G Artemov
Journal of Economic Theory 198, 105370, 2021
152021
Matching and price competition: would personalized prices help?
G Artemov
International Journal of Game Theory 36 (3), 321-331, 2008
112008
Stable matching with mistaken agents
G Artemov, YK Che, YH He
Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics 1 (2), 270-320, 2023
82023
Time and Nash implementation
G Artemov
Games and Economic Behavior 91, 229-236, 2015
82015
For the Student: Matching and Economic Design
G Artemov, S Feldmann, S Loertscher
Australian Economic Review 45 (1), 134-141, 2012
82012
Imminent Nash implementation as a solution to King Solomon’s dilemma
G Artemov
Econ Bull 4, 1-8, 2006
62006
Imminent Nash Implementation
G Artemov
mimeo, 2006
42006
Online Appendix to “Robust Vitual Implementation: Toward a Reinterpretation of the Wilson Doctrine,”
G Artemov, T Kunimoto, R Serrano
Unpublished manuscript, available at https://sites. google. com/site …, 2012
22012
Matching and Economic Design
G Artemov, S Feldmann, S Loertscher
12011
Integer game with delay
G Artemov
Economics Letters 188, 108968, 2020
2020
An impossibility result for virtual implementation with status quo
G Artemov
Economics letters 122 (3), 380-385, 2014
2014
A Trench War, a Fabian Strategy and the Siege of Troy
G Artemov
Available at SSRN 2211902, 2013
2013
Finitely Repeated Bilateral Trade with Renegotiation
G Artemov, S Guriev, D Kvasov
GAME THEORY AND MANAGEMENT. Collected abstracts of papers presented on the …, 2010
2010
Essays on Mechanism Design and Matching
G Artemov
ProQuest, 2007
2007
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