| Strategyproof matching with minimum quotas D Fragiadakis, A Iwasaki, P Troyan, S Ueda, M Yokoo ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation 4 (1), 6, 2016 | 177* | 2016 |
| A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design M Pycia, P Troyan Econometrica 91 (4), 1495-1526, 2023 | 142* | 2023 |
| Improving matching under hard distributional constraints D Fragiadakis, P Troyan Theoretical Economics 12 (2), 863-908, 2017 | 127* | 2017 |
| Comparing school choice mechanisms by interim and ex-ante welfare P Troyan Games and Economic Behavior 75 (2), 936-947, 2012 | 96 | 2012 |
| Obvious manipulations P Troyan, T Morrill Journal of Economic Theory 185, 104970, 2020 | 67 | 2020 |
| Essentially stable matchings P Troyan, D Delacrétaz, A Kloosterman Games and Economic Behavior 120, 370-390, 2020 | 61* | 2020 |
| Obviously Strategy‐Proof Implementation Of Top Trading Cycles P Troyan International Economic Review 60 (3), 1249-1261, 2019 | 61* | 2019 |
| Designing mechanisms to focalize welfare-improving strategies DE Fragiadakis, P Troyan Games and Economic Behavior 114, 232-252, 2019 | 18* | 2019 |
| School choice with asymmetric information: Priority design and the curse of acceptance A Kloosterman, P Troyan Theoretical Economics 15 (3), 1095-1133, 2020 | 14 | 2020 |
| Collusion and signaling in auctions with interdependent values P Troyan Journal of Economic Theory 170, 319-345, 2017 | 12* | 2017 |
| Matching and market design: An introduction to selected topics F Kojima, P Troyan The Japanese Economic Review 62, 82-98, 2011 | 12 | 2011 |
| (Non-) obvious manipulability of rank-minimizing mechanisms P Troyan Journal of Mathematical Economics, 103015, 2024 | 9 | 2024 |
| Rankings-Dependent Preferences: A Real Goods Matching Experiment A Kloosterman, P Troyan arXiv preprint arXiv:2305.03644, 2023 | 3 | 2023 |
| A network formation game with private information A Francetich, P Troyan Manuscript. Working Paper, 2010 | 2 | 2010 |
| The Random Priority Mechanism is Uniquely Simple, Efficient, and Fair M Pycia, P Troyan Working paper, 2023 | 1 | 2023 |
| Implementing diversity in school choice P Troyan, D Fragiadakis | 1 | 2013 |
| Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms in General Environments M Pycia, P Troyan | | 2023 |
| Strategy-proof, Efficient, and Fair Allocation: Beyond Random Priority M Pycia, P Troyan | | 2023 |
| Desirable Rankings: A New Method for Ranking Outcomes of a Competitive Process T Morrill, P Troyan arXiv preprint arXiv:2205.11684, 2022 | | 2022 |
| Desirable Rankings: A New Way of Ranking Outcomes of a Competitive Process T Morrill, P Troyan Available at SSRN 4116886, 2022 | | 2022 |
Daniel E. FragiadakisProfessor of Economics, Texas A&M UniversityAdresse e-mail validée de tamu.edu
