Peter Troyan
Peter Troyan
Adresse e-mail validée de virginia.edu - Page d'accueil
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Strategyproof matching with minimum quotas
D Fragiadakis, A Iwasaki, P Troyan, S Ueda, M Yokoo
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation 4 (1), 6, 2016
1012016
Improving matching under hard distributional constraints
D Fragiadakis, P Troyan
Theoretical Economics 12 (2), 863-908, 2017
84*2017
Improving matching under hard distributional constraints
D Fragiadakis, P Troyan
Theoretical Economics 12 (2), 863-908, 2017
692017
Comparing school choice mechanisms by interim and ex-ante welfare
P Troyan
Games and Economic Behavior 75 (2), 936-947, 2012
672012
A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design
M Pycia, P Troyan
Available at SSRN 2853563, 2019
55*2019
OBVIOUSLY STRATEGY‐PROOF IMPLEMENTATION OF TOP TRADING CYCLES
P Troyan
International Economic Review, 2016
26*2016
Essentially stable matchings
P Troyan, D Delacrétaz, A Kloosterman
Games and Economic Behavior 120, 370-390, 2020
21*2020
Obviously Strategy-Proof Implementation of Top Trading Cycles
P Troyan
Working paper, 2016
192016
Designing mechanisms to focalize welfare-improving strategies
DE Fragiadakis, P Troyan
Games and Economic Behavior 114, 232-252, 2019
15*2019
Obvious manipulations
P Troyan, T Morrill
Journal of Economic Theory 185, 104970, 2020
142020
Strategy-proof mechanisms for two-sided matching with minimum and maximum quotas
S Ueda, D Fragiadakis, A Iwasaki, P Troyan, M Yokoo
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and …, 2012
112012
Collusion and signaling in auctions with interdependent values
P Troyan
Journal of Economic Theory 170, 319-345, 2017
10*2017
Matching and market design: an introduction to selected topics
F Kojima, P Troyan
The Japanese Economic Review 62 (1), 82-98, 2011
42011
A network formation game with private information
A Francetich, P Troyan
Manuscript. Working Paper, 2010
22010
School choice with asymmetric information: Priority design and the curse of acceptance
A Kloosterman, P Troyan
Theoretical Economics 15 (3), 1095-1133, 2020
12020
Essentially stable matchings
D Delacretaz, A Kloosterman, P Troyan
Games and Economic Behavior 120, 2020
12020
Implementing diversity in school choice
P Troyan, D Fragiadakis
12013
Essays in Market Design
PG Troyan
stanford university, 2014
2014
Strategyproof Assignment with Minimum Quotas
DE Fragiadakis, A Iwasaki, P Troyan, S Ueda, M Yokoo
2011
Anqi Li and Ming Yang Optimal incentive contract with endogenous monitoring technology........ 1135
JG Forand, J Zápal, Y Heller, A Schreiber, A Erlanson, A Kleiner, ...
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