Fuhito Kojima
Fuhito Kojima
Associate Professor of Economics, Stanford University
Adresse e-mail validée de stanford.edu - Page d'accueil
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Incentives and stability in large two-sided matching markets
F Kojima, PA Pathak
American Economic Review 99 (3), 608-27, 2009
4092009
Designing random allocation mechanisms: Theory and applications
E Budish, YK Che, F Kojima, P Milgrom
American economic review 103 (2), 585-623, 2013
2882013
Efficient matching under distributional constraints: Theory and applications
Y Kamada, F Kojima
American Economic Review 105 (1), 67-99, 2015
214*2015
Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
JW Hatfield, F Kojima
Journal of Economic theory 145 (5), 1704-1723, 2010
2032010
Asymptotic equivalence of probabilistic serial and random priority mechanisms
YK Che, F Kojima
Econometrica 78 (5), 1625-1672, 2010
200*2010
Matching with couples: Stability and incentives in large markets
F Kojima, PA Pathak, AE Roth
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 128 (4), 1585-1632, 2013
1872013
School choice: Impossibilities for affirmative action
F Kojima
Games and Economic Behavior 75 (2), 685-693, 2012
1862012
Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism
F Kojima, M Manea
Journal of Economic Theory 145 (1), 106-123, 2010
175*2010
Matching with contracts: Comment
JW Hatfield, F Kojima
American Economic Review 98 (3), 1189-94, 2008
1402008
Axioms for deferred acceptance
F Kojima, M Manea
Econometrica 78 (2), 633-653, 2010
1262010
Random assignment of multiple indivisible objects
F Kojima
Mathematical Social Sciences 57 (1), 134-142, 2009
1212009
Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts
JW Hatfield, F Kojima
Games and Economic Behavior 67 (2), 745-749, 2009
982009
The “Boston” school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach
F Kojima, MU Ünver
Economic Theory 55 (3), 515-544, 2014
752014
Stable matching in large economies
YK Che, J Kim, F Kojima
Econometrica 87 (1), 65-110, 2019
712019
Random paths to pairwise stability in many-to-many matching problems: a study on market equilibration
F Kojima, MU Ünver
International Journal of Game Theory 36 (3-4), 473-488, 2008
622008
Voter preferences, polarization, and electoral policies
Y Kamada, F Kojima
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 6 (4), 203-36, 2014
582014
Designing matching mechanisms under general distributional constraints
M Goto, F Kojima, R Kurata, A Tamura, M Yokoo
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 9 (2), 226-62, 2017
562017
Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints
Y Kamada, F Kojima
Journal of Economic theory 168, 107-142, 2017
542017
Strategy-proofness, investment efficiency, and marginal returns: An equivalence
JW Hatfield, F Kojima, SD Kominers
Becker Friedman Institute for Research in Economics Working Paper, 2018
462018
Matching and price competition: comment
F Kojima
American Economic Review 97 (3), 1027-1031, 2007
43*2007
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