Lucian Bebchuk

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Coauteurs

jesse friedProfessor of Law, Harvard Law SchoolAdresse e-mail validée de law.harvard.edu
Urs PeyerINSEADAdresse e-mail validée de insead.edu
Assaf HamdaniProfessor of Law, Tel Aviv UniversityAdresse e-mail validée de tauex.tau.ac.il
David I. WalkerProfessor of Law, Boston UniversityAdresse e-mail validée de bu.edu
Yaniv GrinsteinReichman University and Cornell UniversityAdresse e-mail validée de idc.ac.il
Charles CY WangHarvard Business School, ECGIAdresse e-mail validée de hbs.edu
Wei JiangAsa Griggs Candler Professor of Finance, Emory University Goizueta Business SchoolAdresse e-mail validée de emory.edu
Michael WeisbachProfessor of Finance, Ohio State UniversityAdresse e-mail validée de fisher.osu.edu
Michal BarzuzaNicholas E. Chimicles Research Professor of Business Law and Regulation, UVA Law SchoolAdresse e-mail validée de virginia.edu
Luigi ZingalesProfessor of Finance, University of ChicagoAdresse e-mail validée de chicagobooth.edu
Itay GoldsteinJoel S. Ehrenkranz Family Professor of Finance, Wharton School, University of PennsylvaniaAdresse e-mail validée de wharton.upenn.edu
Randall S. ThomasVanderbilt Law SchoolAdresse e-mail validée de law.vanderbilt.edu
John CoreMIT SloanAdresse e-mail validée de mit.edu

Suivre

Lucian Bebchuk

William J. Friedman & Alicia Townsend Friedman Professor of Law, Economics, and Finance, Harvard Law

Adresse e-mail validée de law.harvard.edu - Page d'accueil

Law and Economics Corporate Governance Corporate Finance Financial Economics Corporate Law


Titre Trier par citations Trier par année Trier par titre	Citée par Citée par	Année
What matters in corporate governance? L Bebchuk, A Cohen, A Ferrell The Review of financial studies 22 (2), 783-827, 2009	5484	2009
Executive compensation as an agency problem LA Bebchuk, JM Fried Journal of economic perspectives 17 (3), 71-92, 2003	3852	2003
Pay without performance: The unfulfilled promise of executive compensation L Bebchuk, JM Fried Harvard University Press, 2006	3267	2006
Managerial power and rent extraction in the design of executive compensation LA Bebchuk, J Fried, D Walker National bureau of economic research, 2002	2958	2002
The case for increasing shareholder power LA Bebchuk Harv. L. Rev. 118, 833, 2004	1893	2004
A theory of path dependence in corporate ownership and governance LA Bebchuk, MJ Roe Stan. L. Rev. 52, 127, 1999	1757	1999
Stock pyramids, cross-ownership, and dual class equity: the mechanisms and agency costs of separating control from cash-flow rights LA Bebchuk, R Kraakman, G Triantis Concentrated corporate ownership, 295-318, 2000	1689	2000
The costs of entrenched boards LA Bebchuk, A Cohen Journal of financial economics 78 (2), 409-433, 2005	1644	2005
The CEO pay slice LA Bebchuk, KJM Cremers, UC Peyer Journal of financial Economics 102 (1), 199-221, 2011	1279	2011
Litigation and settlement under imperfect information LA Bebchuk The RAND Journal of Economics, 404-415, 1984	1234	1984
Federalism and the corporation: the desirable limits on state competition in corporate law LA Bebchuk Harv. L. Rev. 105, 1435, 1991	1215	1991
Pay without performance: Overview of the issues LA Bebchuk, JM Fried US Corporate Governance, 113-143, 2009	1164	2009
Regulating bankers' pay LA Bebchuk, H Spamann Geo. lJ 98, 247, 2009	1052	2009
The powerful antitakeover force of staggered boards: theory, evidence and policy LA Bebchuk, J Coates, G Subramanian National Bureau of Economic Research, 2002	1020	2002
The growth of executive pay L Bebchuk, Y Grinstein Oxford review of economic policy 21 (2), 283-303, 2005	1006	2005
The state of corporate governance research LA Bebchuk, MS Weisbach The review of financial studies 23 (3), 939-961, 2010	932	2010
A rent-protection theory of corporate ownership and control LA Bebchuk National Bureau of Economic Research, 1999	909	1999
The myth of the shareholder franchise LA Bebchuk Va. L. Rev. 93, 675, 2007	882	2007
A new approach to corporate reorganizations LA Bebchuk harvard law review, 775-804, 1988	853	1988
The long-term effects of hedge fund activism LA Bebchuk, A Brav, W Jiang National Bureau of Economic Research, 2015	837	2015

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