Certifiable Pre‐Play Communication: Full Disclosure J Hagenbach, F Koessler, E Perez‐Richet Econometrica 82 (3), 1093-1131, 2014 | 89 | 2014 |
Altruism in networks R Bourlès, Y Bramoullé, E Perez‐Richet Econometrica 85 (2), 675-689, 2017 | 71 | 2017 |
Interim bayesian persuasion: First steps E Perez-Richet American Economic Review 104 (5), 469-74, 2014 | 60 | 2014 |
Test Design under Falsification E Perez-Richet, V Skreta | 32* | 2017 |
Complicating to persuade E Perez-Richet, D Prady Available at SSRN 1868066, 2011 | 26 | 2011 |
Communication with Evidence in the Lab J Hagenbach, E Perez-Richet Games and Economic Behavior 112, 139-165, 2018 | 21 | 2018 |
Evidence reading mechanisms F Koessler, E Perez-Richet Social Choice and Welfare, 1-23, 2019 | 15* | 2019 |
Competing with equivocal information E Perez-Richet | 10 | 2012 |
Choosing choices: Agenda selection with uncertain issues R Godefroy, E Perez‐Richet Econometrica 81 (1), 221-253, 2013 | 9 | 2013 |
A proof of Blackwell’s theorem E Perez-Richet Mimeo, 2016 | 6 | 2016 |
A note on the tight simplification of mechanisms E Perez-Richet Economics Letters 110 (1), 15-17, 2011 | 6 | 2011 |
Altruism and Risk Sharing in Networks R Bourles, Y Bramoulle, E Perez-Richet | 4 | 2018 |
Information design with agency J Bizzotto, E Perez-Richet, A Vigier CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13868, 2019 | | 2019 |