A theory of participation in elections T Feddersen, A Sandroni American Economic Review 96 (4), 1271-1282, 2006 | 619 | 2006 |

Non-Bayesian social learning A Jadbabaie, P Molavi, A Sandroni, A Tahbaz-Salehi Games and Economic Behavior 76 (1), 210-225, 2012 | 571 | 2012 |

Do markets favor agents able to make accurate predictions? A Sandroni Econometrica 68 (6), 1303-1341, 2000 | 482 | 2000 |

Rationalization V Cherepanov, T Feddersen, A Sandroni Theoretical Economics 8 (3), 775-800, 2013 | 284 | 2013 |

Moral bias in large elections: Theory and experimental evidence T Feddersen, S Gailmard, A Sandroni American Political Science Review 103 (2), 175-192, 2009 | 284 | 2009 |

Overconfidence, insurance, and paternalism A Sandroni, F Squintani American Economic Review 97 (5), 1994-2004, 2007 | 207 | 2007 |

Non-bayesian learning LG Epstein, J Noor, A Sandroni The BE Journal of Theoretical Economics 10 (1), 0000102202193517041623, 2010 | 133 | 2010 |

Calibration with many checking rules A Sandroni, R Smorodinsky, RV Vohra Mathematics of operations Research 28 (1), 141-153, 2003 | 118 | 2003 |

Non-Bayesian updating: a theoretical framework LG Epstein, J Noor, A Sandroni Theoretical Economics 3 (2), 193-229, 2008 | 112 | 2008 |

Ethical voters and costly information acquisition T Feddersen, A Sandroni Quarterly Journal of Political Science 1 (3), 287-312, 2006 | 103 | 2006 |

The reproducible properties of correct forecasts A Sandroni International Journal of Game Theory 32 (1), 151-159, 2003 | 94 | 2003 |

A belief-based theory of homophily W Kets, A Sandroni Games and Economic Behavior 115, 410-435, 2019 | 82 | 2019 |

Overconfidence and asymmetric information: The case of insurance A Sandroni, F Squintani Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 93, 149-165, 2013 | 80 | 2013 |

Manipulability of future‐independent tests W Olszewski, A Sandroni Econometrica 76 (6), 1437-1466, 2008 | 55 | 2008 |

The calculus of ethical voting T Feddersen, A Sandroni International Journal of Game Theory 35, 1-25, 2006 | 54 | 2006 |

Market selection when markets are incomplete A Sandroni Journal of Mathematical Economics 41 (1-2), 91-104, 2005 | 52 | 2005 |

A theory of strategic uncertainty and cultural diversity W Kets, A Sandroni The Review of Economic Studies 88 (1), 287-333, 2021 | 46 | 2021 |

On the convergence to homogeneous expectations when markets are complete A Araujo, A Sandroni Econometrica 67 (3), 663-672, 1999 | 45 | 1999 |

A nonmanipulable test W Olszewski, A Sandroni | 41 | 2009 |

Efficient markets and Bayes’ rule A Sandroni Economic Theory 26, 741-764, 2005 | 40 | 2005 |