| Tail‐dependence in stock‐return pairs I Fortin, C Kuzmics Intelligent Systems in Accounting, Finance & Management 11 (2), 89-107, 2002 | 117 | 2002 |
| Representative consumer's risk aversion and efficient risk-sharing rules C Hara, J Huang, C Kuzmics Journal of Economic Theory 137 (1), 652-672, 2007 | 86* | 2007 |
| Hidden symmetries and focal points C Alós-Ferrer, C Kuzmics Journal of Economic Theory 148 (1), 226-258, 2013 | 48 | 2013 |
| Abraham Wald's complete class theorem and Knightian uncertainty C Kuzmics Games and Economic Behavior 104, 666-673, 2017 | 44* | 2017 |
| Symmetric play in repeated allocation games C Kuzmics, T Palfrey, BW Rogers Journal of Economic Theory 154, 25-67, 2014 | 32 | 2014 |
| Refined best reply correspondence and dynamics D Balkenborg, J Hofbauer, C Kuzmics Theoretical Economics 8 (1), 165-192, 2013 | 32 | 2013 |
| Evolutionary stability of discrimination under observability F Herold, C Kuzmics Games and Economic Behavior 67 (2), 542-551, 2009 | 32* | 2009 |
| Effects of background risks on cautiousness with an application to a portfolio choice problem C Hara, J Huang, C Kuzmics Journal of Economic Theory 146 (1), 346-358, 2011 | 24* | 2011 |
| Stochastic evolutionary stability in extensive form games of perfect information C Kuzmics Games and Economic Behavior 48 (2), 321-336, 2004 | 23* | 2004 |
| On public good provision mechanisms with dominant strategies and balanced budget C Kuzmics, JH Steg Journal of Economic Theory 170, 56-69, 2017 | 20 | 2017 |
| The refined best-response correspondence in normal form games D Balkenborg, J Hofbauer, C Kuzmics International Journal of Game Theory 44 (1), 165-193, 2015 | 14* | 2015 |
| On the elimination of dominated strategies in stochastic models of evolution with large populations C Kuzmics Games and Economic Behavior 72 (2), 452-466, 2011 | 14 | 2011 |
| Pre-election polls as strategic coordination devices C Andonie, C Kuzmics Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 84 (2), 681-700, 2012 | 11 | 2012 |
| Individual and group selection in symmetric 2-player games C Kuzmics Mimeo, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, 2003 | 9 | 2003 |
| An incomplete information justification of symmetric equilibrium in symmetric games C Kuzmics, BW Rogers Available at SSRN 1712102, 2010 | 6 | 2010 |
| The evolution of taking roles F Herold, C Kuzmics Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 174, 38-63, 2020 | 5 | 2020 |
| A comment on “Egalitarianism and efficiency in repeated symmetric games” by V. Bhaskar [Games Econ. Behav. 32 (2000) 247–262] C Kuzmics, B Rogers Games and Economic Behavior 74 (1), 240-242, 2012 | 5 | 2012 |
| Refined best-response correspondence and dynamics D Balkenborg, J Hofbauer, C Kuzmics SSRN, 2011 | 5 | 2011 |
| The evolution of moral codes of behavior C Kuzmics, C Rodriguez-Sickert Available at SSRN 910292, 2009 | 4 | 2009 |
| Optimal Bandwidth Selection in Non-Parametric Spectral Density Estimation I Fortin, C Kuzmics Review and Simulation, 1999 | 4 | 1999 |
Brian W. RogersAssociate Professor, Washington University in St. Louis, Dept. of EconomicsAdresse e-mail validée de wustl.edu
