Krishnamurthy Iyer
Krishnamurthy Iyer
Industrial and Systems Engineering, University of Minnesota
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Mean field equilibria of dynamic auctions with learning
K Iyer, R Johari, M Sundararajan
Management Science 60 (12), 2949-2970, 2014
1432014
Optimal signaling mechanisms in unobservable queues
D Lingenbrink, K Iyer
Operations Research, 2019
37*2019
Information aggregation and allocative efficiency in smooth markets
K Iyer, R Johari, CC Moallemi
Management Science 60 (10), 2509-2524, 2014
36*2014
Mean field equilibria for resource competition in spatial settings
P Yang, K Iyer, P Frazier
Stochastic Systems 8 (4), 307-334, 2018
31*2018
From monetary to nonmonetary mechanism design via artificial currencies
A Gorokh, S Banerjee, K Iyer
Mathematics of Operations Research, 2021
21*2021
Signaling in online retail: Efficacy of public signals
D Lingenbrink, K Iyer
Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and …, 2018
132018
Information design for congested social services: Optimal need-based persuasion
J Anunrojwong, K Iyer, V Manshadi
arXiv preprint arXiv:2005.07253, 2020
72020
When fixed price meets priority auctions: Competing firms with different pricing and service rules
J Gao, K Iyer, H Topaloglu
Stochastic Systems 9 (1), 47–80, 2019
62019
Welfare analysis of dark pools
K Iyer, R Johari, C Moallemi
62016
Persuading risk-conscious agents: A geometric approach
J Anunrojwong, K Iyer, D Lingenbrink
Available at SSRN 3386273, 2020
42020
Information design in spatial resource competition
P Yang, K Iyer, P Frazier
arXiv preprint arXiv:1909.12723, 2019
42019
Price competition under linear demand and finite inventories: Contraction and approximate equilibria
J Gao, K Iyer, H Topaloglu
Operations Research Letters 45 (4), 382-387, 2017
42017
Sensitivity analysis and optimal ultimately stationary deterministic policies in some constrained discounted cost models
K Iyer, N Hemachandra
Mathematical Methods of Operations Research 71 (3), 401-425, 2010
42010
When bribes are harmless: The power and limits of collusion-resilient mechanism design
A Gorokh, S Banerjee, K Iyer
Available at SSRN 3125003, 2019
22019
Information and the value of execution guarantees
K Iyer, R Johari, CC Moallemi
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 673-673, 2012
22012
Tractable equilibria in sponsored search with endogenous budgets
DF Ciocan, K Iyer
Operations research 69 (1), 227-244, 2021
12021
Ultimately stationary deterministic strategies for stochastic games
KR Iyer, N Hemachandra
Proceedings of the international conference on advances in control and …, 2007
12007
Learning to Persuade on the Fly: Robustness Against Ignorance
Y Zu, K Iyer, H Xu
arXiv preprint arXiv:2102.10156, 2021
2021
Scrip Economies Are Fair and (Approximately) Efficient
A Gorokh, S Banerjee, K Iyer
Available at SSRN 3411444, 2019
2019
Dynamic Analysis of Markets
K Iyer
PQDT-Global, 2012
2012
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