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Giuseppe Lopomo
Giuseppe Lopomo
Professor of Business Administration, Duke University
Adresse e-mail validée de duke.edu
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Collusion via signalling in simultaneous ascending bid auctions with heterogeneous objects, with and without complementarities
S Brusco, G Lopomo
The Review of Economic Studies 69 (2), 407-436, 2002
1902002
Uncertainty in mechanism design
G Lopomo, L Rigotti, C Shannon
arXiv preprint arXiv:2108.12633, 2021
802021
Strategic commitments and the principle of reciprocity in interconnection pricing
N Economides, G Lopomo, G Woroch
The economics of digital markets, 62-99, 2009
742009
Carbon allowance auction design: an assessment of options for the United States
G Lopomo, LM Marx, D McAdams, B Murray
Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, 2011
642011
Regulatory pricing rules to neutralize network dominance
N Economides, G Lopomo, G Woroch
Industrial and Corporate Change 5 (4), 1013-1028, 1996
631996
Optimality and robustness of the English auction
G Lopomo
Games and Economic Behavior 36 (2), 219-240, 2001
622001
Knightian uncertainty and moral hazard
G Lopomo, L Rigotti, C Shannon
Journal of Economic Theory 146 (3), 1148-1172, 2011
582011
Simultaneous ascending auctions with complementarities and known budget constraints
S Brusco, G Lopomo
Economic Theory 38, 105-124, 2009
572009
Bargaining, interdependence, and the rationality of fair division
G Lopomo, EA Ok
RAND Journal of Economics, 263-283, 2001
572001
Efficient mechanisms for mergers and acquisitions
S Brusco, G Lopomo, DT Robinson, S Viswanathan
International Economic Review 48 (3), 995-1035, 2007
542007
The English auction is optimal among simple sequential auctions
G Lopomo
Journal of Economic Theory 82 (1), 144-166, 1998
541998
Delegating management to experts
C Dai, TR Lewis, G Lopomo
The Rand Journal of Economics 37 (3), 503-520, 2006
532006
Bidder collusion at first-price auctions
G Lopomo, LM Marx, P Sun
Review of Economic Design 15 (3), 177-211, 2011
432011
Collusion via signalling in open ascending auctions with multiple objects and complementarities
S Brusco, G Lopomo
NYU Working Paper No. EC-99-05, 1999
361999
Split-award procurement auctions with uncertain scale economies: Theory and data
JJ Anton, S Brusco, G Lopomo
Games and Economic Behavior 69 (1), 24-41, 2010
352010
Inefficiency of collusion at english auctions
G Lopomo, RC Marshall, LM Marx
The BE Journal of Theoretical Economics 5 (1), 0000102202153459711156, 2005
352005
Stairway to heaven or highway to hell: Liquidity, sweat equity, and the uncertain path to ownership
RV Krishna, G Lopomo, CR Taylor
The RAND Journal of Economics 44 (1), 104-127, 2013
332013
BUDGET CONSTRAINTS AND DEMAND REDUCTION IN SIMULTANEOUS ASCENDING‐BID AUCTIONS*
S Brusco, G Lopomo
The Journal of Industrial Economics 56 (1), 113-142, 2008
332008
Uncertainty in mechanism design
G Lopomo, L Rigotti, C Shannon
Unpublished paper, University of Pittsburgh.[975], 2014
292014
Resource allocation under demand uncertainty and private information
A Belloni, G Lopomo, S Wang
Management Science 63 (12), 4219-4235, 2017
212017
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