| The day care assignment: A dynamic matching problem J Kennes, D Monte, N Tumennasan American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 6 (4), 362-406, 2014 | 82 | 2014 |
| Matching with quorums D Monte, N Tumennasan Economics Letters 120 (1), 14-17, 2013 | 31 | 2013 |
| To err is human: Implementation in quantal response equilibria N Tumennasan Games and Economic Behavior 77 (1), 138-152, 2013 | 28 | 2013 |
| Centralized allocation in multiple markets D Monte, N Tumennasan Journal of Mathematical Economics 61, 74-85, 2015 | 25 | 2015 |
| Strategic performance of deferred acceptance in dynamic matching problems J Kennes, D Monte, N Tumennasan American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 11 (2), 55-97, 2019 | 13* | 2019 |
| Whose opinion counts? Implementation by sortition R Saran, N Tumennasan Games and Economic Behavior 78, 72-84, 2013 | 11 | 2013 |
| Dominance of truthtelling and the lattice structure of Nash equilibria O Bochet, N Tumennasan Journal of Economic Theory 185, 104952, 2020 | 9 | 2020 |
| Quantity precommitment and price-matching N Tumennasan Journal of Mathematical Economics 49 (5), 375-388, 2013 | 9 | 2013 |
| Consensus in social networks: Revisited S Kivinen, N Tumennasan Journal of Mathematical Economics 83, 11-18, 2019 | 6 | 2019 |
| Prevalence of truthtelling and implementation O Bochet, N Tumennasan Technical report, 2017 | 6 | 2017 |
| Moral hazard and stability N Tumennasan Social Choice and Welfare 43 (3), 659-682, 2014 | 6* | 2014 |
| Daycare choice and ethnic diversity: Evidence from a randomized survey M Batsaikhan, M Gørtz, JR Kennes, RS Lyng, D Monte, N Tumennasan Available at SSRN 3507520, 2019 | 5 | 2019 |
| One truth and a thousand lies: Focal points in mechanism design O Bochet, N Tumennasan Available at SSRN 3002539, 2017 | 5 | 2017 |
| Robust group strategy‐proofness S Kivinen, N Tumennasan Theoretical Economics 16 (4), 1351-1389, 2021 | 4 | 2021 |
| Social policies and activation in the Scandinavian welfare model: the case of Denmark TM Andersen | 4 | 2011 |
| One truth and a thousand lies: Defaults and benchmarks in mechanism design O Bochet, N Tumennasan Mimeo, 2021 | 3 | 2021 |
| Output decisions and price matching: theory and experiment M Batsaikhan, N Tumennasan Management Science 64 (8), 3609-3624, 2018 | 3 | 2018 |
| Discrimination and daycare choice: Evidence from a randomized survey M Batsaikhan, M Gørtz, J Kennes, RS Lyng, D Monte, N Tumennasan Journal of Human Resources, 2024 | 2 | 2024 |
| Eliciting and Aggregating Information By Sortition in Collective Choice R Saran, N Tumennasan The Economic Journal 129 (620), 1924-1952, 2019 | 2* | 2019 |
| Quantity precommitment and price matching N Tumennasan | 2 | 2011 |
Daniel MonteUnitoVerified email at fgv.br
