Stephen Rassenti
Stephen Rassenti
Professor of Economics and Mathematics, Chapman University
ยืนยันอีเมลแล้วที่ chapman.edu
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อ้างโดย
อ้างโดย
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A combinatorial auction mechanism for airport time slot allocation
SJ Rassenti, VL Smith, RL Bulfin
The Bell Journal of Economics, 402-417, 1982
9461982
Combinatorial auction design
D Porter, S Rassenti, A Roopnarine, V Smith
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 100 (19), 11153-11157, 2003
2642003
Game theory and reciprocity in some extensive form experimental games
KA McCabe, SJ Rassenti, VL Smith
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 93 (23), 13421-13428, 1996
2021996
Controlling market power and price spikes in electricity networks: Demand-side bidding
SJ Rassenti, VL Smith, BJ Wilson
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 100 (5), 2998-3003, 2003
1972003
Adaptation and convergence of behavior in repeated experimental Cournot games
S Rassenti, SS Reynolds, VL Smith, F Szidarovszky
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 41 (2), 117-146, 2000
1712000
Smart computer-assisted markets
KA McCabe, SJ Rassenti, VL Smith
Science 254 (5031), 534-538, 1991
1671991
Reciprocity, trust, and payoff privacy in extensive form bargaining
KA McCabe, SJ Rassenti, VL Smith
Games and economic behavior 24 (1-2), 10-24, 1998
1661998
Automated exchange for the efficient assignment of audience items
M Bykowsky, M Olson, S Rassenti, A Sholtz
US Patent App. 09/731,785, 2002
1652002
Theory, experiment and the federal communications commission spectrum auctions
J Banks, M Olson, D Porter, S Rassenti, V Smith
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 51 (3), 303-350, 2003
1632003
The Design of``Smart''Water Market Institutions Using Laboratory Experiments
JJ Murphy, A Dinar, RE Howitt, SJ Rassenti, VL Smith
Environmental and Resource Economics 17 (4), 375-394, 2000
1542000
Discriminatory price auctions in electricity markets: low volatility at the expense of high price levels
SJ Rassenti, VL Smith, BJ Wilson
Journal of regulatory Economics 23 (2), 109-123, 2003
1492003
Auction institutional design: Theory and behavior of simultaneous multiple-unit generalizations of the Dutch and English auctions
KA McCabe, SJ Rassenti, VL Smith
The American Economic Review 80 (5), 1276-1283, 1990
1461990
Bertrand-Edgeworth competition in experimental markets
JB Kruse, S Rassenti, SS Reynolds, VL Smith
Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 343-371, 1994
1451994
Designing ‘smart’computer-assisted markets: An experimental auction for gas networks
KA McCabe, SJ Rassenti, VL Smith
European Journal of Political Economy 5 (2-3), 259-283, 1989
1421989
Designing a uniform-price double auction: An experimental evaluation
KA McCabe, SJ Rassenti, VL Smith
The Double Auction Market Institutions, Theories, and Evidence, 307-332, 2018
1182018
Using experiments to inform the privatization/deregulation movement in electricity
SJ Rassenti, VL Smith, BJ Wilson
Cato J. 21, 515, 2001
1182001
The design, testing and implementation of Virginia’s NOx allowance auction
D Porter, S Rassenti, W Shobe, V Smith, A Winn
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 69 (2), 190-200, 2009
822009
Spot market mechanism design and competitivity issues in electric power
MJ Denton, SJ Rassenti, VL Smith
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 44 (4), 435-453, 2001
762001
Designing call auction institutions: is double Dutch the best?
KA McCabe, SJ Rassenti, VL Smith
The Economic Journal 102 (410), 9-23, 1992
701992
Cotenancy and competition in an experimental auction market for natural gas pipeline networks
SJ Rassenti, SS Reynolds, VL Smith
Economic Theory, 41-65, 1994
691994
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