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Nenad Kos
Nenad Kos
Associate Professor, Department of Economics, Bocconi
Adresse e-mail validée de unibocconi.it
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Optimal selling mechanisms under moment conditions
V Carrasco, VF Luz, N Kos, M Messner, P Monteiro, H Moreira
Journal of Economic Theory 177, 245-279, 2018
1122018
The design of ambiguous mechanisms
A Di Tillio, N Kos, M Messner
The Review of Economic Studies 84 (1), 237-276, 2016
882016
Extremal incentive compatible transfers
N Kos, M Messner
Journal of Economic Theory 148 (1), 134-164, 2013
452013
Communication and efficiency in auctions
N Kos
Games and Economic Behavior 75 (1), 233-249, 2012
422012
Selling to the Mean
N Kos, M Messner
Available at SSRN 2632014, 2015
262015
Just enough or all: Selling a firm
M Ekmekci, N Kos, R Vohra
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 8 (3), 223-256, 2016
242016
Information in tender offers with a large shareholder
M Ekmekci, N Kos
Econometrica 84 (1), 87-139, 2016
24*2016
Asking questions
N Kos
Games and Economic Behavior 87, 642-650, 2014
192014
Efficient Trade Mechanism with Discrete Values
N Kos, M Manea
16*
Epidemics with behavior
C Carnehl, S Fukuda, N Kos
Journal of Economic Theory 207, 105590, 2023
12*2023
Value of information and fairness opinions in takeovers
M Ekmekci, N Kos
Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research Working Paper 510, 2014
102014
Incentive compatibility in non-quasilinear environments
N Kos, M Messner
Economics Letters 121 (1), 12-14, 2013
82013
Signaling covertly acquired information
M Ekmekci, N Kos
Journal of Economic Theory 214, 105746, 2023
72023
Time-varying Cost of Distancing: Distancing Fatigue, Holidays and Lockdowns
C Carnehl, S Fukuda, N Kos
arXiv preprint arXiv:2206.03847, 2022
32022
Optimal pricing, private information and search for an outside offer
S Auster, N Kos, S Piccolo
The RAND Journal of Economics 52 (4), 758-777, 2021
2*2021
Robust Product Design and Pricing
K Kim, N Kos
2023
Monopoly with Product Design
K Kim, N Kos
Available at SSRN 4425071, 2023
2023
Essays on mechanism design with limited communication and congestion in global games
N Kos
Northwestern University, 2008
2008
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