Suivre
Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin
Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin
TU Eindhoven
Adresse e-mail validée de tue.nl - Page d'accueil
Titre
Citée par
Citée par
Année
Approval-based apportionment
M Brill, P Gölz, D Peters, U Schmidt-Kraepelin, K Wilker
Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 34 (02), 1854-1861, 2020
51*2020
Picking sequences and monotonicity in weighted fair division
M Chakraborty, U Schmidt-Kraepelin, W Suksompong
Artificial Intelligence 301, 103578, 2021
332021
Liquid democracy with ranked delegations
M Brill, T Delemazure, AM George, M Lackner, U Schmidt-Kraepelin
Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 36 (5), 4884-4891, 2022
252022
Popular branchings and their dual certificates
T Kavitha, T Király, J Matuschke, I Schlotter, U Schmidt-Kraepelin
Mathematical Programming 192 (1), 567-595, 2022
252022
Weighted envy-freeness for submodular valuations
L Montanari, U Schmidt-Kraepelin, W Suksompong, N Teh
Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 38 (9), 9865-9873, 2024
222024
Margin of victory for tournament solutions
M Brill, U Schmidt-Kraepelin, W Suksompong
Artificial Intelligence 302, 103600, 2022
152022
The price of justified representation
E Elkind, P Faliszewski, A Igarashi, P Manurangsi, U Schmidt-Kraepelin, ...
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation 12 (3), 1-27, 2024
142024
The popular assignment problem: when cardinality is more important than popularity∗
T Kavitha, T Király, J Matuschke, I Schlotter, U Schmidt-Kraepelin
Proceedings of the 2022 annual ACM-SIAM symposium on discrete algorithms …, 2022
112022
Refining tournament solutions via margin of victory
M Brill, U Schmidt-Kraepelin, W Suksompong
Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 34 (02), 1862-1869, 2020
112020
Margin of victory in tournaments: Structural and experimental results
M Brill, U Schmidt-Kraepelin, W Suksompong
Proceedings of the 35th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI …, 2021
92021
Maintaining Perfect Matchings at Low Cost
J Matuschke, U Schmidt-Kraepelin, J Verschae
46th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP …, 2019
92019
Proportional representation in matching markets: selecting multiple matchings under dichotomous preferences
N Boehmer, M Brill, U Schmidt-Kraepelin
Social Choice and Welfare 64 (1), 179-220, 2025
8*2025
Justifying groups in multiwinner approval voting
E Elkind, P Faliszewski, A Igarashi, P Manurangsi, U Schmidt-Kraepelin, ...
Theoretical Computer Science 969, 114039, 2023
82023
Democratising forest management: Applying multiwinner approval voting to tree selection
A Pommerening, M Brill, U Schmidt-Kraepelin, J Haufe
Forest Ecology and Management 478, 118509, 2020
72020
Multiwinner voting with possibly unavailable candidates
M Brill, H Dindar, J Israel, J Lang, J Peters, U Schmidt-Kraepelin
Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 37 (5), 5532-5539, 2023
62023
Approval-based committee voting in practice: a case study of (over-) representation in the Polkadot blockchain
N Boehmer, M Brill, A Cevallos, J Gehrlein, L Sánchez-Fernández, ...
Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 38 (9), 9519-9527, 2024
52024
Project-fair and truthful mechanisms for budget aggregation
R Freeman, U Schmidt-Kraepelin
Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 38 (9), 9704-9712, 2024
52024
Monotone randomized apportionment
J Correa, P Gölz, U Schmidt-Kraepelin, J Tucker-Foltz, V Verdugo
Proceedings of the 25th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 71-71, 2024
42024
Dueling bandits with team comparisons
L Cohen, U Schmidt-Kraepelin, Y Mansour
Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 34, 20633-20644, 2021
32021
Truthful Budget Aggregation: Beyond Moving-Phantom Mechanisms
M de Berg, R Freeman, U Schmidt-Kraepelin, M Utke
arXiv preprint arXiv:2405.20303, 2024
22024
Le système ne peut pas réaliser cette opération maintenant. Veuillez réessayer plus tard.
Articles 1–20