Ichiro Obara

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Michihiro KandoriProfessor of Economics, The University of TokyoAdresse e-mail validée de e.u-tokyo.ac.jp
v bhaskarDepartment of Economics, University of Texas at AustinAdresse e-mail validée de austin.utexas.edu
David RahmanUniversity of MinnesotaAdresse e-mail validée de umn.edu
andrew postlewaiteProfessor of Economics, University of PennsylvaniaAdresse e-mail validée de econ.upenn.edu
George J. MailathUniversity of Pennsylvania and Australian National UniversityAdresse e-mail validée de econ.upenn.edu
Makoto YokooKyushu UniversityAdresse e-mail validée de inf.kyushu-u.ac.jp
Atsushi IwasakiUniversity of Electro-CommunicationsAdresse e-mail validée de is.uec.ac.jp
Federico ZincenkoCollege of Business, University of Nebraska-LincolnAdresse e-mail validée de unl.edu
Sushil BikhchandaniAnderson School of Management, UCLAAdresse e-mail validée de anderson.ucla.edu
Jaeok ParkProfessor of Economics, Yonsei UniversityAdresse e-mail validée de yonsei.ac.kr
Tadashi SekiguchiInstitute of Economic Research, Kyoto UniversityAdresse e-mail validée de kier.kyoto-u.ac.jp
Daehyun KimAssistant Professor, POSTECHAdresse e-mail validée de postech.ac.kr
Hongbin CaiProfessor of Economics, Hong Kong University

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Ichiro Obara

University of California Los Angeles

Adresse e-mail validée de econ.ucla.edu - Page d'accueil

Economics Game Theory Learning Network


Titre Trier par citations Trier par année Trier par titre	Citée par Citée par	Année
Efficiency in repeated games revisited: The role of private strategies M Kandori, I Obara Econometrica 74 (2), 499-519, 2006	154	2006
Belief-based equilibria in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with private monitoring V Bhaskar, I Obara Journal of Economic Theory 102 (1), 40-69, 2002	145	2002
Firm reputation and horizontal integration H Cai, I Obara The RAND Journal of Economics 40 (2), 340-363, 2009	100	2009
Folk theorem with communication I Obara Journal of Economic Theory 144 (1), 120-134, 2009	93	2009
Mediated partnerships D Rahman, I Obara Econometrica 78 (1), 285-308, 2010	77	2010
The full surplus extraction theorem with hidden actions I Obara The BE Journal of Theoretical Economics 8 (1), 0000102202193517041399, 2008	53	2008
The maximum efficient equilibrium payoff in the repeated prisoners' dilemma GJ Mailath, I Obara, T Sekiguchi Games and Economic Behavior 40 (1), 99-122, 2002	37	2002
Towards a belief-based theory of repeated games with private monitoring: An application of POMDP M Kandori, I Obara Report.[694], 2010	27	2010
Private Strategy and E¢ ciency: Repeated Partnership Games Revisited I Obaray University of Pennsylvania Working Paper, 2000	22	2000
Repeated games with general discounting I Obara, J Park Yonsei University, Yonsei Economics Research Institute Working papers, 2015	21	2015
Collusion and heterogeneity of firms I Obara, F Zincenko The RAND Journal of Economics 48 (1), 230-249, 2017	19*	2017
Mechanism design with information acquisition S Bikhchandani, I Obara Economic Theory 63 (3), 783-812, 2017	17*	2017
Endogenous monitoring M Kandori, I Obara Unpublished manuscript, University of Tokyo and UCLA, 2004	14	2004
Less is more: an observability paradox in repeated games M Kandori, I Obara International Journal of Game Theory 34, 475-493, 2006	13	2006
Informational smallness and private monitoring R McLean, I Obara, A Postlewaite PIER Working Paper 11-029, University of Pennsylvania.[70], 2011	11*	2011
Repeated games with general time preference I Obara, J Park working paper, 2014	6	2014
Automated equilibrium analysis of repeated games with private monitoring: a POMDP approach. YJ Joe, A Iwasaki, M Kandori, I Obara, M Yokoo AAMAS, 1305-1306, 2012	6	2012
Secret contracts for efficient partnerships D Rahman, I Obara University of Minnesota, Department of Economics, 2008-3, 2008	6	2008
Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring R McLean, I Obara, A Postlewaite Journal of Economic Theory 153, 191-212, 2014	4	2014
The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Private Monitoring: a N-player case I Obara University of Pennsylvania, Center for Analytic Research in Economics and …, 1999	4	1999

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