Vasiliki Skreta
Vasiliki Skreta
Professor of Economics, UT Austin, UCL, CEPR
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Ratings shopping and asset complexity: A theory of ratings inflation
V Skreta, L Veldkamp
Journal of Monetary Economics 56 (5), 678-695, 2009
6072009
Optimal interventions in markets with adverse selection
T Philippon, V Skreta
American Economic Review 102 (1), 1-28, 2012
2432012
Sequentially optimal mechanisms
V Skreta
The Review of Economic Studies 73 (4), 1085-1111, 2006
1602006
Optimal auction design under non-commitment
V Skreta
Journal of Economic Theory 159, 854-890, 2015
1002015
Dynamic strategic information transmission
M Golosov, V Skreta, A Tsyvinski, A Wilson
Journal of Economic Theory 151, 304-341, 2014
882014
On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure
V Skreta
Review of Economic Design 15 (1), 1-36, 2011
462011
The role of optimal threats in auction design
N Figueroa, V Skreta
Journal of Economic Theory 144 (2), 884-897, 2009
382009
Test design under falsification
E Perez-Richet, V Skreta
Work. Pap., Sci. Po, Paris Access provided by University of Chicago …, 2018
322018
Mechanism design with limited commitment
L Doval, V Skreta
Available at SSRN 3281132, 2020
252020
Optimal allocation mechanisms with single-dimensional private information
N Figueroa, V Skreta
Review of Economic Design 15 (3), 213-243, 2011
232011
Heterogeneity, inattention, and bayesian updates
R Giacomini, V Skreta, J Turen
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 12 (1), 282-309, 2020
212020
Constrained information design: Toolkit
L Doval, V Skreta
arXiv preprint arXiv:1811.03588, 2018
212018
Mechanism design for arbitrary type spaces
V Skreta
Economics Letters 91 (2), 293-299, 2006
202006
Selling through referrals
D Condorelli, A Galeotti, V Skreta
Journal of economics & management strategy 27 (4), 669-685, 2018
192018
Informed seller with taste heterogeneity
F Koessler, V Skreta
Journal of Economic Theory 165, 456-471, 2016
182016
The role of outside options in auction design
N Figueroa, V Skreta
NYU working paper, 2007
182007
Asymmetric partnerships
N Figueroa, V Skreta
Economics Letters 115 (2), 268-271, 2012
132012
Mechanism design with budget constraints and a continuum of agents
M Richter
mimeo., New York University, 2011
102011
Optimal auctions with general distribution
V Skreta
102007
Incentive-driven inattention
WP Gaglianone, R Giacomini, JV Issler, V Skreta
Journal of Econometrics, 2020
92020
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