Normative decision theory E Elliott Analysis 79 (4), 755-772, 2019 | 15 | 2019 |
Ramsey without ethical neutrality: A new representation theorem E Elliott Mind 126 (501), 1-51, 2017 | 13 | 2017 |
A Representation Theorem for Frequently Irrational Agents E Elliott Journal of Philosophical Logic, 2016 | 11 | 2016 |
Epistemic two-dimensionalism and arguments from epistemic misclassification E Elliott, K McQueen, C Weber Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2), 375-389, 2013 | 11 | 2013 |
Betting against the Zen Monk: on preferences and partial belief E Elliott Synthese 198 (4), 3733-3758, 2021 | 8 | 2021 |
Probabilism, representation theorems, and whether deliberation crowds out prediction E Elliott Erkenntnis 82, 379-399, 2017 | 8 | 2017 |
‘Ramseyfying’probabilistic comparativism E Elliott Philosophy of Science 87 (4), 727-754, 2020 | 7 | 2020 |
Frank Ramsey F MacBride, M Marion, MJ Frápolli, D Edgington, E Elliott, S Lutz, J Paris | 7 | 2019 |
Comparativism and the measurement of partial belief E Elliott Erkenntnis 87 (6), 2843-2870, 2022 | 6 | 2022 |
Impossible worlds and partial belief E Elliott Synthese 196 (8), 3433-3458, 2019 | 5 | 2019 |
Representation Theorems and the Grounds of Intentionality E Elliott Australian National University, 2015 | 3 | 2015 |
Unawareness and implicit belief EJR Elliott | 2 | 2023 |
What Is ‘Real’in Interpersonal Comparisons of Confidence E Elliott Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (1), 102-116, 2022 | 2 | 2022 |
Don’t Stop Believing (Hold onto That Warm Fuzzy Feeling) EJR Elliott, J Isserow Ethics 132 (1), 4-37, 2021 | 2 | 2021 |
The Measurement of Subjective Probability EJR Elliott Elements in Decision Theory and Philosophy, 2024 | | 2024 |
How to Read a Representor E Elliott | | 2024 |
Radical Misinterpretation E Elliott Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 104 (3), 646-684, 2023 | | 2023 |
Correction to: Comparativism and the Measurement of Partial Belief E Elliott Erkenntnis 88 (2), 867-867, 2023 | | 2023 |
Representation Theorems and Radical Interpretation EJR Elliott | | |