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Brian Baisa
Brian Baisa
Assistant Professor of Economics, Amherst College
Adresse e-mail validée de amherst.edu - Page d'accueil
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The welfare costs of unreliable water service
B Baisa, LW Davis, SW Salant, W Wilcox
Journal of Development Economics 92 (1), 1-12, 2010
852010
Auction Design without Quasilinear Preferences
B Baisa
Theoretical Economics 12 (1), 53 - 78, 2017
612017
Efficient multiunit auctions for normal goods
B Baisa
Theoretical Economics 15 (1), 361-413, 2020
362020
Large multi-unit auctions with a large bidder
B Baisa, J Burkett
Journal of Economic Theory 174, 1-15, 2018
262018
Optimal auctions with endogenous budgets
B Baisa, S Rabinovich
Economics letters 141, 162-165, 2016
92016
Overbidding and inefficiencies in multi-unit Vickrey auctions for normal goods
B Baisa
Games and Economic Behavior 99, 23-35, 2016
9*2016
A detail-free and efficient auction for budget constrained bidders
B Baisa
mimeo, Amherst College, 2015
52015
Discriminatory price auctions with resale and optimal quantity caps
B Baisa, J Burkett
Theoretical Economics 15 (1), 1-28, 2020
42020
Efficient ex post implementable auctions and English auctions for bidders with non-quasilinear preferences
B Baisa, J Burkett
Journal of Mathematical Economics 82, 227-246, 2019
42019
Quantifying the inefficiency of multi-unit auctions for normal goods
B Baisa, S Essig Aberg
Available at SSRN 3912928, 2021
22021
An efficient auction for budget constrained bidders with multi-dimensional types
B Baisa
Technical report Mimeo, August, 2018
22018
Efficient Auctions for Normal Goods
B Baisa
2017
Optimal Quantity Caps in Discriminatory Price Auctions with Resale
B Baisa, J Burkett
Available at SSRN 2918991, 2017
2017
Hu Fu, Robert D. Kleinberg, Ron Lavi, and Rann Smorodinsky Job security, stability, and production efficiency................................ 1 René Kirkegaard A unifying …
B Baisa, P Bich, R Laraki, P Eso, B Szentes, L Ye, C Zhang, T Suzuki, ...
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