Daisuke Oyama
Daisuke Oyama
Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo
Adresse e-mail validée de e.u-tokyo.ac.jp - Page d'accueil
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Sampling best response dynamics and deterministic equilibrium selection
D Oyama, WH Sandholm, O Tercieux
Theoretical Economics 10 (1), 243-281, 2015
592015
Agglomeration under forward-looking expectations: Potentials and global stability
D Oyama
Regional Science and Urban Economics 39 (6), 696-713, 2009
572009
Monotone methods for equilibrium selection under perfect foresight dynamics
D Oyama, S Takahashi, J Hofbauer
Theoretical Economics 3 (2), 155–192, 2008
532008
History versus expectations in economic geography reconsidered
D Oyama
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 33 (2), 394-408, 2009
492009
Iterated potential and robustness of equilibria
D Oyama, O Tercieux
Journal of Economic Theory 144 (4), 1726-1769, 2009
402009
Rationalizable foresight dynamics
A Matsui, D Oyama
Games and Economic Behavior 56 (2), 299-322, 2006
33*2006
p-Dominance and Equilibrium Selection under Perfect Foresight Dynamics
D Oyama
Journal of Economic Theory 107 (2), 288-310, 2002
322002
On the impact of trade on the industrial structures of nations
D Oyama, Y Sato, T Tabuchi, JF Thisse
International Journal of Economic Theory 7 (1), 93-109, 2011
242011
On efficient partnership dissolution under ex post individual rationality
S Galavotti, N Muto, D Oyama
Economic Theory 48 (1), 87-123, 2011
222011
Booms and slumps in a game of sequential investment with the changing fundamentals
D Oyama
Japanese Economic Review 55 (3), 311-320, 2004
222004
Robust equilibria under non-common priors
D Oyama, O Tercieux
Journal of Economic Theory 145 (2), 752-784, 2010
19*2010
On the relationship between robustness to incomplete information and noise-independent selection in global games
D Oyama, S Takahashi
Journal of Mathematical Economics 47 (6), 683-688, 2011
172011
Contagion and uninvadability in local interaction games: The bilingual game and general supermodular games
D Oyama, S Takahashi
Journal of Economic Theory 157, 100-127, 2015
14*2015
Generalized Belief Operator and Robustness in Binary‐Action Supermodular Games
D Oyama, S Takahashi
Econometrica 88 (2), 693-726, 2020
12*2020
Monotone and local potential maximizers in symmetric 3x3 supermodular games
D Oyama, S Takahashi
Economics Bulletin 29 (3), 2132-2144, 2009
92009
On the strategic impact of an event under non-common priors
D Oyama, O Tercieux
Games and Economic Behavior 74 (1), 321-331, 2012
8*2012
On the (non-) differentiability of the optimal value function when the optimal solution is unique
D Oyama, T Takenawa
Journal of Mathematical Economics 76, 21-32, 2018
7*2018
経済学から見た障害者雇用納付金・調整金制度
土橋俊寛, 尾山大輔
日本労働研究雑誌 578, 43-52, 2008
72008
Implementation via Information Design in Binary-Action Supermodular Games
S Morris, D Oyama, S Takahashi
5*2020
Perfect foresight dynamics in binary supermodular games
D Oyama, S Takahashi, J Hofbauer
International Journal of Economic Theory 7 (3), 251-267, 2011
5*2011
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