S. Matthew Weinberg
S. Matthew Weinberg
Assistant Professor, Princeton University
Adresse e-mail validée de princeton.edu - Page d'accueil
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On the instability of bitcoin without the block reward
M Carlsten, H Kalodner, SM Weinberg, A Narayanan
Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications …, 2016
2692016
Matroid prophet inequalities and applications to multi-dimensional mechanism design
R Kleinberg, SM Weinberg
Games and Economic Behavior 113, 97-115, 2019
199*2019
Optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design: Reducing revenue to welfare maximization
Y Cai, C Daskalakis, SM Weinberg
2012 IEEE 53rd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 130-139, 2012
1832012
A simple and approximately optimal mechanism for an additive buyer
M Babaioff, N Immorlica, B Lucier, SM Weinberg
2014 IEEE 55th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 21-30, 2014
1682014
An algorithmic characterization of multi-dimensional mechanisms
Y Cai, C Daskalakis, SM Weinberg
Proceedings of the forty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing …, 2012
1542012
Pricing lotteries
P Briest, S Chawla, R Kleinberg, SM Weinberg
Journal of Economic Theory 156, 144-174, 2015
130*2015
A duality-based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design
Y Cai, NR Devanur, SM Weinberg
SIAM Journal on Computing, STOC16-160-STOC16-200, 2019
1142019
Arbitrum: Scalable, private smart contracts
H Kalodner, S Goldfeder, X Chen, SM Weinberg, EW Felten
27th {USENIX} Security Symposium ({USENIX} Security 18), 1353-1370, 2018
1042018
Simple mechanisms for a subadditive buyer and applications to revenue monotonicity
A Rubinstein, SM Weinberg
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC) 6 (3-4), 1-25, 2018
972018
Symmetries and optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design
C Daskalakis, SM Weinberg
Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, 370-387, 2012
86*2012
Understanding incentives: Mechanism design becomes algorithm design
Y Cai, C Daskalakis, SM Weinberg
2013 IEEE 54th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 618-627, 2013
822013
Prior independent mechanisms via prophet inequalities with limited information
PD Azar, R Kleinberg, SM Weinberg
Games and Economic Behavior 118, 511-532, 2019
80*2019
Reducing revenue to welfare maximization: Approximation algorithms and other generalizations
Y Cai, C Daskalakis, SM Weinberg
Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete …, 2013
702013
Optimal and efficient parametric auctions
P Azar, S Micali, C Daskalakis, SM Weinberg
Proceedings of the twenty-fourth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete …, 2013
522013
Bitcoin: A natural oligopoly
N Arnosti, SM Weinberg
arXiv preprint arXiv:1811.08572, 2018
482018
Parallel algorithms for select and partition with noisy comparisons
M Braverman, J Mao, SM Weinberg
Proceedings of the forty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of Computing …, 2016
452016
Formal barriers to longest-chain proof-of-stake protocols
J Brown-Cohen, A Narayanan, A Psomas, SM Weinberg
Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 459-473, 2019
432019
The sample complexity of up-to-ε multi-dimensional revenue maximization
YA Gonczarowski, SM Weinberg
Journal of the ACM (JACM) 68 (3), 1-28, 2021
302021
The competition complexity of auctions: A bulow-klemperer result for multi-dimensional bidders
A Eden, M Feldman, O Friedler, I Talgam-Cohen, SM Weinberg
arXiv preprint arXiv:1612.08821, 2016
282016
A simple and approximately optimal mechanism for a buyer with complements
A Eden, M Feldman, O Friedler, I Talgam-Cohen, SM Weinberg
Operations Research 69 (1), 188-206, 2021
272021
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