Jason Hartline

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Andrew V. GoldbergSenior Principal Scientist, Amazon.com, Inc.Adresse e-mail validée de alum.mit.edu
Anna R. KarlinBill & Melinda Gates Chair and Professor of Computer Science and Engineering, University ofAdresse e-mail validée de cs.washington.edu
Shuchi ChawlaUniversity of Wisconsin - MadisonAdresse e-mail validée de cs.wisc.edu
Robert KleinbergDepartment of Computer Science, Cornell UniversityAdresse e-mail validée de cs.cornell.edu
Tim RoughgardenColumbia UniversityAdresse e-mail validée de cs.columbia.edu
Nima HaghpanahAssociate Professor, Penn State UniversityAdresse e-mail validée de psu.edu
Balasubramanian SivanGoogle Research, New YorkAdresse e-mail validée de google.com
Hu FuUniversity of British ColumbiaAdresse e-mail validée de cs.ubc.ca
Brendan LucierMicrosoft ResearchAdresse e-mail validée de microsoft.com
Nicole ImmorlicaMicrosoft ResearchAdresse e-mail validée de microsoft.com
aleck johnsenPhD Candidate, Northwestern UniversityAdresse e-mail validée de u.northwestern.edu
David MalecPostdoc, Department of Economics, University of MarylandAdresse e-mail validée de umd.edu
Avrim BlumProfessor and Chief Academic Officer, Toyota Technological Institute at ChicagoAdresse e-mail validée de ttic.edu
nikhil r. devanurAmazonAdresse e-mail validée de nikhildevanur.com
Saeed AlaeiGoogle ResearchAdresse e-mail validée de google.com
azarakhsh malekianRotman School of ManagementAdresse e-mail validée de mit.edu
Rad NiazadehThe University of Chicago Booth School of BusinessAdresse e-mail validée de chicagobooth.edu
Yingkai LiNational University of SingaporeAdresse e-mail validée de nus.edu.sg
Maria-Florina BalcanProfessor, School of Computer Science, Carnegie Mellon UniversityAdresse e-mail validée de cs.cmu.edu
Denis NekipelovUniversity of VirginiaAdresse e-mail validée de virginia.edu

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Jason Hartline

Professor of Computer Science, Northwestern U.

Adresse e-mail validée de northwestern.edu - Page d'accueil

auction theory mechanism design algorithmic game theory


Titre Trier par citations Trier par année Trier par titre	Citée par Citée par	Année
Competitive auctions AV Goldberg, JD Hartline, AR Karlin, M Saks, A Wright Games and Economic Behavior 55 (2), 242-269, 2006	698*	2006
Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing S Chawla, JD Hartline, DL Malec, B Sivan Proceedings of the forty-second ACM symposium on Theory of computing, 311-320, 2010	662	2010
Optimal marketing strategies over social networks J Hartline, V Mirrokni, M Sundararajan Proceedings of the 17th international conference on World Wide Web, 189-198, 2008	503	2008
Competitive auctions for multiple digital goods AV Goldberg, JD Hartline European Symposium on Algorithms, 416-427, 2001	428	2001
On profit-maximizing envy-free pricing. V Guruswami, JD Hartline, AR Karlin, D Kempe, C Kenyon, F McSherry SODA 5, 1164-1173, 2005	416	2005
Simple versus optimal mechanisms JD Hartline, T Roughgarden Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, 225-234, 2009	398	2009
Algorithmic pricing via virtual valuations S Chawla, JD Hartline, R Kleinberg Proceedings of the 8th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 243-251, 2007	320	2007
Optimal mechanism design and money burning JD Hartline, T Roughgarden Proceedings of the fortieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing, 75-84, 2008	258	2008
Reducing mechanism design to algorithm design via machine learning MF Balcan, A Blum, JD Hartline, Y Mansour Journal of Computer and System Sciences 74 (8), 1245-1270, 2008	248*	2008
Optimal crowdsourcing contests S Chawla, JD Hartline, B Sivan Games and Economic Behavior 113, 80-96, 2019	220	2019
Competitive generalized auctions A Fiat, AV Goldberg, JD Hartline, AR Karlin Proceedings of the thiry-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing …, 2002	180	2002
Near-optimal online auctions A Blum, JD Hartline Carnegie Mellon University, 2005	160	2005
Mechanism design and approximation JD Hartline Book draft. October 122 (1), 2013	157*	2013
Non-optimal mechanism design JD Hartline, B Lucier American Economic Review 105 (10), 3102-3124, 2015	152*	2015
Derandomization of auctions G Aggarwal, A Fiat, AV Goldberg, JD Hartline, N Immorlica, M Sudan Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of …, 2005	147	2005
Knapsack auctions G Aggarwal, JD Hartline SODA 6, 1083-1092, 2006	143	2006
On algorithms for efficient data migration J Hall, J Hartline, AR Karlin, J Saia, J Wilkes Proceedings of the twelfth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms …, 2001	142	2001
Collusion-resistant mechanisms for single-parameter agents AV Goldberg, JD Hartline SODA 5, 620-629, 2005	123	2005
Efficient computation of optimal auctions via reduced forms S Alaei, H Fu, N Haghpanah, J Hartline, A Malekian Mathematics of Operations Research 44 (3), 1058-1086, 2019	119*	2019
When is pure bundling optimal? N Haghpanah, J Hartline The Review of Economic Studies 88 (3), 1127-1156, 2021	115*	2021

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