Aggregation of Bayesian preferences: unanimity vs monotonicity F Ceron, V Vergopoulos Social Choice and Welfare 52, 419-451, 2019 | 5 | 2019 |
Approval voting without ballot restrictions F Ceron, S Gonzalez Theoretical Economics 16 (3), 759-775, 2021 | 3 | 2021 |
Axiomatic Characterizations of the Knapsack and Greedy Participatory Budgeting Methods F Ceron, S Gonzalez, A Navarro-Ramos Working paper (2022).(Cited on page 65), 2022 | 2 | 2022 |
On stochastic independence under ambiguity F Ceron, V Vergopoulos Economic Theory 71 (3), 925-960, 2021 | 2 | 2021 |
Recursive objective and subjective multiple priors F Ceron, V Vergopoulos Documents de travail du Centre d'Économie de la Sorbonne, 2020 | 2 | 2020 |
Objective rationality and recursive multiple priors F Ceron, V Vergopoulos Journal of Mathematical Economics 102, 102761, 2022 | 1 | 2022 |
A characterization of Approval Voting without the approval balloting assumption F Ceron, S Gonzalez Available at SSRN 3519847, 2019 | 1 | 2019 |
On the aggregation of preferences, ballots and imprecise probabilistic information F Ceron | | 2019 |
Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne F Ceron, JM Tallon | | 2014 |
" Objective" Ambiguity and Ex Ante Trade F Ceron | | 2014 |
Market power and welfare in asymmetric divisible good auctions................ 1095 Yunan Li Mechanism design with financially constrained agents and costly verification.. 1139 F Ceron, S Gonzalez, A Baillon, Y Xu, P Marx, J Schummer, E Kohlberg, ... | | |