| Contact rate epidemic control of COVID-19: an equilibrium view R Elie, E Hubert, G Turinici Mathematical Modelling of Natural Phenomena 15 (35), 1-25, 2020 | 96 | 2020 |
| Mean–field moral hazard for optimal energy demand response management R Elie, E Hubert, T Mastrolia, D Possamaï Mathematical Finance 31 (1), 399-473, 2021 | 52 | 2021 |
| Incentives, lockdown, and testing: from Thucydides’ analysis to the COVID-19 pandemic E Hubert, T Mastrolia, D Possamaï, X Warin Journal of mathematical biology 84 (5), 37, 2022 | 26 | 2022 |
| Nash-MFG equilibrium in a SIR model with time dependent newborn vaccination E Hubert, G Turinici Ricerche di Matematica 67 (1), 227-246, 2018 | 20 | 2018 |
| Continuous-time incentives in hierarchies E Hubert Finance and Stochastics 27 (3), 605-661, 2023 | 11 | 2023 |
| Optimal contracts under adverse selection for staple goods such as energy: Effectiveness of in-kind insurance C Alasseur, C Chaton, E Hubert Energy Economics 106, 105785, 2022 | 2* | 2022 |
| A new approach to principal-agent problems with volatility control A Chiusolo, E Hubert arXiv preprint arXiv:2407.09471, 2024 | 1 | 2024 |
| Closed-loop equilibria for Stackelberg games: it's all about stochastic targets C Hernández, NH Santibáñez, E Hubert, D Possamaï arXiv preprint arXiv:2406.19607, 2024 | 1 | 2024 |
| Interactions and incitatives: between contract theory and mean-field games E Hubert Université Paris-Est, 2020 | | 2020 |
Romuald ElieDeepmind & Université Gustave EiffelVerified email at u-pem.fr
