| Mediated audits M Pollrich The RAND Journal of Economics 48 (1), 44-68, 2017 | 9 | 2017 |
| Imprecise information disclosure and truthful certification M Pollrich, L Wagner European Economic Review 89, 345-360, 2016 | 8 | 2016 |
| Sweet Lemons: Mitigating collusion in organizations C von Negenborn, M Pollrich Journal of Economic Theory 189, 105074, 2020 | 7 | 2020 |
| Optimal auctions with signaling bidders O Bos, M Pollrich ZEW-Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper, 2020 | 7 | 2020 |
| Sequential procurement with limited commitment N Fugger, V Gretschko, M Pollrich ZEW-Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper, 2019 | 5 | 2019 |
| Informational opacity and honest certification M Pollrich, L Wagner DIW Berlin Discussion Paper, 2013 | 5 | 2013 |
| Auctions with signaling bidders: Optimal design and information disclosure O Bos, M Pollrich Available at SSRN 4252493, 2022 | 3 | 2022 |
| Incomplete contracts in multi-period procurement V Gretschko, M Pollrich Management Science 68 (7), 5146-5161, 2022 | 3 | 2022 |
| Gütesiegel: Zu detaillierte Angaben können die Funktionsfähigkeit der Zertifikate schmälern M Pollrich, L Wagner DIW Wochenbericht 80 (19), 15-18, 2013 | 3 | 2013 |
| The irrelevance of fee structures for certification M Pollrich, R Strausz American Economic Review: Insights 6 (1), 55-72, 2024 | 2 | 2024 |
| Incomplete contracts in dynamic procurement V Gretschko, M Pollrich ZEW-Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper, 2019 | 2 | 2019 |
| The Maximum Punishment Principle and Precision of Audits under Limited Commitment M Pollrich BDPEMS Working Paper, 2015 | 2 | 2015 |
| Optimal incentive contracts to avert firm relocation M Pollrich, RC Schmidt | 2 | 2014 |
| Unobservable investments, limited commitment, and the curse of firm relocation M Pollrich, RC Schmidt BDPEMS working paper series, 2014 | 2 | 2014 |
| Hold-up with unobservable investment and the value of restricting to simple contracts M Pollrich Available at SSRN 4326246, 2023 | | 2023 |
| Information design in sequential procurement N Fugger, V Gretschko, M Pollrich Games and Economic Behavior 135, 79-85, 2022 | | 2022 |
| Sweet Lemons: Mitigating Collusion in Organizations M Pollrich, C von Negenborn Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, 2018 | | 2018 |
| Essays in Microeconomics M Pollrich Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, 2015 | | 2015 |
| On the benefits of mediation in contracting problems with limited commitment M Pollrich | | 2013 |
| Informational opacity and honest certification April 2013 M Pollrich, L Wagner | | 2013 |
Vitali GretschkoUniversity of MünsterAdresse e-mail validée de wiwi.uni-muenster.de
