Shmuel Zamir - Citations Google Scholar

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Citations	6953	1995
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Coauteurs

Bernhard von StengelProfessor of Mathematics, London School of EconomicsAdresse e-mail validée de nash.lse.ac.uk
sylvain sorinIMJ, Université Pierre et Marie CurieAdresse e-mail validée de imj-prg.fr
Marco ScarsiniLUISSAdresse e-mail validée de luiss.it
Todd R. KaplanEconomics Department, University of Haifa and University of ExeterAdresse e-mail validée de ex.ac.uk
Bezalel PelegThe Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, The Hebrew UniversityAdresse e-mail validée de math.huji.ac.il
Vesna PrasnikarResearch scientist, Comlabgames, Pittsburgh, USAAdresse e-mail validée de comlabgames.com
Alvin E. RothAdresse e-mail validée de hbs.edu
Elmar G. WolfstetterHumboldt University at Berlin, Korea University SeoulAdresse e-mail validée de rz.hu-berlin.de
Gary BornsteinProfessor of PsychologyAdresse e-mail validée de huji.ac.il
Olivier GossnerCNRS - École Polytechnique and LSEAdresse e-mail validée de polytechnique.edu
Abdolkarim SadriehProfessor of Economics and Management, University of MagdeburgAdresse e-mail validée de ovgu.de
Philip RenyDepartment of Economics, University of ChicagoAdresse e-mail validée de uchicago.edu
eyal winterHebrew UniversityAdresse e-mail validée de pluto.huji.ac.il
Yair TaumanStony Brook univrsity and IDC HerzliyaAdresse e-mail validée de idc.ac.il
Reinhard SeltenProfessor at University of BonnAdresse e-mail validée de uis.no
Irit NowikDepartment of Industrial engineering and management, Jerusalem College of TechnologyAdresse e-mail validée de g.jct.ac.il
David BudescuProfessor of Psychology, Fordham UniversityAdresse e-mail validée de fordham.edu
Motty PerryUniversity of WarwickAdresse e-mail validée de mail.huji.ac.il
D. Marc KilgourProfessor of MathematicsAdresse e-mail validée de wlu.ca
Jean-Marc TallonParis School of EconomicsAdresse e-mail validée de psemail.eu

Shmuel Zamir

Center for the Study of Rationality, The Hebrew University

Adresse e-mail validée de math.huji.ac.il - Page d'accueil

Game Theory Auction Theory


Titre	Citée par	Année
Bargaining and market behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An experimental study AE Roth, V Prasnikar, M Okuno-Fujiwara, S Zamir The American Economic Review, 1068-1095, 1991	1788	1991
Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information JF Mertens, S Zamir International Journal of Game Theory 14 (1), 1-29, 1985	899	1985
Repeated games JF Mertens Game Theory and Applications, 77-130, 1990	478*	1990
Lower rank approximation of matrices by least squares with any choice of weights KR Gabriel, S Zamir Technometrics 21 (4), 489-498, 1979	350	1979
Inspection games R Avenhaus, B Von Stengel, S Zamir Handbook of game theory with economic applications 3, 1947-1987, 2002	206	2002
Type indeterminacy: A model of the KT (Kahneman–Tversky)-man AL Mogiliansky, S Zamir, H Zwirn Journal of Mathematical Psychology 53 (5), 349-361, 2009	177	2009
On the existence of pure strategy monotone equilibria in asymmetric first‐price auctions PJ Reny, S Zamir Econometrica 72 (4), 1105-1125, 2004	172	2004
The value of two-person zero-sum repeated games with lack of information on both sides JF Mertens, S Zamir International Journal of Game Theory 1 (1), 39-64, 1971	172	1971
Distributed welfare games JR Marden, A Wierman Operations Research 61 (1), 155-168, 2013	165*	2013
Cooperation in intergroup, N-person, and two-person games of chicken G Bornstein, D Budescu, S Zamir Journal of Conflict Resolution 41 (3), 384-406, 1997	154	1997
Asymmetric first-price auctions with uniform distributions: analytic solutions to the general case TR Kaplan, S Zamir Economic Theory 50 (2), 269-302, 2012	116	2012
Leadership with commitment to mixed strategies B Von Stengel, S Zamir Technical Report LSE-CDAM-2004-01, CDAM Research Report, 2004	114	2004
On the value of information in a strategic conflict MI Kamien, Y Tauman, S Zamir Games and Economic Behavior 2 (2), 129-153, 1990	111	1990
Structural and kinetic studies on the solubilization of lecithin by sodium deoxycholate D Lichtenberg, Y Zilberman, P Greenzaid, S Zamir Biochemistry 18 (16), 3517-3525, 1979	104	1979
Leadership games with convex strategy sets B Von Stengel, S Zamir Games and Economic Behavior 69 (2), 446-457, 2010	91	2010
Positive value of information in games B Bassan, O Gossner, M Scarsini, S Zamir International Journal of Game Theory 32 (1), 17-31, 2003	87	2003
Repeated games of incomplete information: Zero-sum S Zamir Handbook of Game Theory 1, 109-154, 1992	85	1992
Inspection games in arms control R Avenhaus, M Canty, DM Kilgour, B Von Stengel, S Zamir European Journal of Operational Research 90 (3), 383-394, 1996	84	1996
“Big match” with lack of information on one side (part I) S Sorin International Journal of Game Theory 13 (4), 201-255, 1984	75	1984
First–price auctions when the ranking of valuations is common knowledge M Landsberger, J Rubinstein, E Wolfstetter, S Zamir Review of Economic Design 6 (3-4), 461-480, 2001	62	2001

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