Shmuel Zamir

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Coauteurs

Bernhard von StengelProfessor of Mathematics, London School of EconomicsAdresse e-mail validée de nash.lse.ac.uk
Todd R. KaplanEconomics Department, University of Haifa and University of ExeterAdresse e-mail validée de ex.ac.uk
Marco ScarsiniLUISSAdresse e-mail validée de luiss.it
Bezalel PelegThe Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, The Hebrew UniversityAdresse e-mail validée de math.huji.ac.il
Vesna PrasnikarResearch scientist, Comlabgames, Pittsburgh, USAAdresse e-mail validée de comlabgames.com
Alvin E. RothAdresse e-mail validée de hbs.edu
Elmar G. WolfstetterHumboldt University at Berlin, Korea University SeoulAdresse e-mail validée de rz.hu-berlin.de
Gary BornsteinProfessor of PsychologyAdresse e-mail validée de huji.ac.il
Abdolkarim SadriehProfessor of Economics and Management, University of MagdeburgAdresse e-mail validée de ovgu.de
Olivier GossnerCNRS - École Polytechnique and LSEAdresse e-mail validée de polytechnique.edu
Philip RenyDepartment of Economics, University of ChicagoAdresse e-mail validée de uchicago.edu
eyal winterHebrew UniversityAdresse e-mail validée de pluto.huji.ac.il
Yair TaumanStony Brook univrsity and IDC HerzliyaAdresse e-mail validée de idc.ac.il
Reinhard SeltenProfessor at University of BonnAdresse e-mail validée de uis.no
David BudescuProfessor of Psychology, Fordham UniversityAdresse e-mail validée de fordham.edu
Irit NowikDepartment of Industrial engineering and management, Jerusalem College of TechnologyAdresse e-mail validée de g.jct.ac.il
Motty PerryUniversity of WarwickAdresse e-mail validée de mail.huji.ac.il
D. Marc KilgourProfessor of MathematicsAdresse e-mail validée de wlu.ca
Jean-Marc TallonParis School of EconomicsAdresse e-mail validée de psemail.eu
Idan SegevProf. of Computational Neuroscience, Hebrew University of JerusalemAdresse e-mail validée de mail.huji.ac.il

Shmuel Zamir

Center for the Study of Rationality, The Hebrew University

Adresse e-mail validée de math.huji.ac.il - Page d'accueil

Game Theory Auction Theory


Titre Trier par citations Trier par année Trier par titre	Citée par Citée par	Année
Bargaining and market behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An experimental study AE Roth, V Prasnikar, M Okuno-Fujiwara, S Zamir The American economic review, 1068-1095, 1991	1868	1991
Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information JF Mertens, S Zamir International Journal of Game Theory 14 (1), 1-29, 1985	933	1985
Repeated games JF Mertens Game Theory and Applications, 77-130, 1990	499*	1990
Lower rank approximation of matrices by least squares with any choice of weights KR Gabriel, S Zamir Technometrics 21 (4), 489-498, 1979	361	1979
Inspection games R Avenhaus, B Von Stengel, S Zamir Handbook of game theory with economic applications 3, 1947-1987, 2002	230	2002
Distributed welfare games JR Marden, A Wierman Operations Research 61 (1), 155-168, 2013	185*	2013
Type indeterminacy: A model of the KT (Kahneman–Tversky)-man AL Mogiliansky, S Zamir, H Zwirn Journal of Mathematical Psychology 53 (5), 349-361, 2009	181	2009
On the existence of pure strategy monotone equilibria in asymmetric first‐price auctions PJ Reny, S Zamir Econometrica 72 (4), 1105-1125, 2004	179	2004
The value of two-person zero-sum repeated games with lack of information on both sides JF Mertens, S Zamir International Journal of Game Theory 1 (1), 39-64, 1971	177	1971
Cooperation in intergroup, N-person, and two-person games of chicken G Bornstein, D Budescu, S Zamir Journal of Conflict Resolution 41 (3), 384-406, 1997	161	1997
Leadership with commitment to mixed strategies B Von Stengel, S Zamir Technical Report LSE-CDAM-2004-01, CDAM Research Report, 2004	131	2004
Asymmetric first-price auctions with uniform distributions: analytic solutions to the general case TR Kaplan, S Zamir Economic Theory 50 (2), 269-302, 2012	125	2012
On the value of information in a strategic conflict MI Kamien, Y Tauman, S Zamir Games and Economic Behavior 2 (2), 129-153, 1990	120	1990
Structural and kinetic studies on the solubilization of lecithin by sodium deoxycholate D Lichtenberg, Y Zilberman, P Greenzaid, S Zamir Biochemistry 18 (16), 3517-3525, 1979	109	1979
Leadership games with convex strategy sets B Von Stengel, S Zamir Games and Economic Behavior 69 (2), 446-457, 2010	104	2010
Inspection games in arms control R Avenhaus, M Canty, DM Kilgour, B Von Stengel, S Zamir European Journal of Operational Research 90 (3), 383-394, 1996	95	1996
Positive value of information in games B Bassan, O Gossner, M Scarsini, S Zamir International Journal of Game Theory 32 (1), 17-31, 2003	88	2003
Repeated games of incomplete information: Zero-sum S Zamir Handbook of Game Theory 1, 109-154, 1992	88	1992
Udder disease etiology, milk somatic cell counts and NAGase activity in Israeli Assaf sheep throughout lactation G Leitner, M Chaffer, S Zamir, T Mor, A Glickman, M Winkler, L Weisblit, ... Small Ruminant Research 39 (2), 107-112, 2001	84	2001
“Big match” with lack of information on one side (part I) S Sorin International Journal of Game Theory 13 (4), 201-255, 1984	76	1984

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